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Destroyal of the personal belongings
of the deceased
On bone and flesh type of objects:
Elaborating Hertz in Australia
par
Eric VENBRUX*
RÉSUMÉ
Les Aborigènes Tiwi des îles Melville et Bathurst, au
nord de l’Australie, sont bien connus dans la littérature
ethnographique, et leurs rites mortuaires élaborés ne
sont pas ce qui contribue le moins à cette réputation.
Dans cet article, je me pencherai sur un aspect de la
façon dont les Tiwi traitent la mort qui a reçu peu
d’attention jusqu’ici, à savoir la destruction des biens
personnels du défunt. Les Tiwi se débarrassent des
objets d’une personne décédée pour des raisons à la fois
émotionnelles et cosmologiques. Les survivants considè-
rent que laisser ces objets présents serait trop doulou-
reux, mais il n’est pas nécessaire de tout détruire aussi-
tôt : un objet choisi peut être mis de côté et utilisé pour
focaliser l’émotion lors des rites mortuaires finaux, qui
interviennent des mois après un décès. Les rites mortuai-
res tiwi ont beaucoup de similitude avec le modèle de
Hertz relatif aux funérailles primaires et secondaires,
bien qu’il n’existe pas de réel traitement des restes cor-
porels. Il y a coïncidence de l’accomplissement des
rituels, de la transition de l’esprit vers l’autre monde, de
la période de deuil des survivants, et, dans le cas traité
par Hertz, de la décomposition du corps (jusqu’au
moment où les os sont secs). Dans le cas tiwi, on
n’observe pas de traitement secondaire des restes, mais
le traitement d’un tronc d’arbre ou de perches et l’annu-
lation de la matérialité de la chair. La destruction des
possessions personnelles du défunt, en même temps
qu’une objectification de souvenirs non-matériels, ser-
vent à constituer le nouvel esprit du mort.
M- : Hertz, chair, os, destruction, biens per-
sonnels
ABSTRACT
The Tiwi Aborigines from Melville and Bathurst
Islands in north Australia are well-known in the ethno-
graphic literature, not in the least for their elaborate
mortuary rituals. In this paper I will focus on an aspect
of Tiwi people’s dealing with death that thus far has
received little attention, namely the destroyal of the
personal belongings of the deceased. Tiwi people do
away with a dead person’s objects for both emotional
and cosmological reasons. The survivors consider a
continued presence of the objects too painful, but not
everything needs to be destroyed at once: a selected
object may be saved and employed as an emotional focus
in mourning in the final mortuary rites, taking place
many months after a death. Tiwi mortuary rituals have
much in common with Hertz’s model of primary and
secondary burials, although there is no actual secondary
treatment of the remains. The accomplishment of the
rituals, the transition of the spirit to the other world, the
period of mourning for the survivors, and in Hertz’s case
the decomposition of the corpse (when the bones are
dry), coincide. In the Tiwi case we do not have a secon-
dary treatment of the remains but a treatment of tree
trunks or poles and the undoing of the materiality or
flesh, of the deceased’s former existence. The destroyal
of personal belongings, along with an objectification of
immaterial memories, serves to constitute the new spirit
of the dead.
K: Hertz, flesh, bone, destroyal, personal
belongings
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In the mid-1980s I did fieldwork in an ancient
and remote village in the Swiss Alps. The living
maintained close relationships with the dead.
The latter were seen, for instance, in a procession
on the mountain ridge. Some heard dead relati-
ves in the attic and others encountered them in
the fields (Venbrux, 1988, 1991, 1994). The wife
of a shepherd, once told me about an eerie wake
for her aunt. She was adamant there had been
something wrong. The lid of the coffin stood to
the wall; all of a sudden it dropped. The candles
went out. And the crucifix moved.
Then followed the crux of the story: the
woman had inherited nothing from her beloved
aunt, not even a single object to keep as a
memento! Distant relatives had taken it all away.
It went without saying that the aunt protested
posthumously. The signs on the night before her
burial conveyed the message that her niece ¢ the
raconteur ¢ had been wronged (Venbrux 1988).
So much for the emotional investment in clin-
ging to the intimate possessions of the deceased.
Fights over an inheritance are a matter of course
in European societies (cf. Lacey, 1998: 6).
Not so in an Australian Aboriginal society
where I conducted fieldwork next. In contrast to
the inhabitants of the Swiss mountain village,
the Tiwi Aborigines from Melville and Bathurst
Islands got rid of the personal belongings of the
deceased. They destroyed them. Next, the dead’s
personal effects were buried, burnt or thrown
into the sea. Whereas it hurt the European she-
pherd’s wife not to have a memento, the Austra-
lian hunter-gatherers considered it too painful to
keep such things. Upon death everything
connected with the person in question became
taboo.
What we have here, are two sharply contras-
ting attitudes to the objects that belonged to the
deceased. Why is it that in certain societies or
instances these things ¢ which happen to be
treasured in other ones ¢ are destroyed?
The practice raises questions about the rela-
tionship between the living and the dead. James
Frazer (1886: 75 n1) already speculated that
‘‘The fear of the dead, which underlies all these
burial customs, may have sprung from the idea that
they were angry with the living for dispossessing them.
Hence, rather than use the property of the deceased
and thereby incur the anger of his ghost, men
destroyed it’’.
The intellectualist (mentalist) hypothesis has
its counterpart in a more down-to-earth, mate-
rialist one, namely that the circumstance that no
one ‘‘dared inherit anything from a dead relative
ensured economic equality’’ (Palgi and Abramo-
vitch, 1984: 395). This suggests that the mor-
tuary practice would be confined to egalitarian
societies. It is not borne out by the facts, how-
ever; the potlatching Tinglit (Kan, 1989) are a
case in point.
A third hypothesis in relation to the phenome-
non stresses the connection between the spiritual
and the material. It starts from the idea that
destruction enables a transition from one form
of existence to another. Albeit already mentio-
ned by Edward Tylor, James Frazer and others, it
was to become the basic tenet of Robert Hertz’s
theory in his seminal essay ‘A contribution to the
study of the collective representation of death’
(1960 [1907]). Hertz writes:
‘‘to make a material object or living being pass from
this world to the next, to free or create the soul, it must
be destroyed. [...] As the visible object vanishes it is
reconstructed in the beyond, transformed to a greater
or lesser degree. The same belief applies to the soul
and the body of the deceased’’ (1960: 46).
Hertz thus accepts that people hold the belief
that the destruction of material objects ¢ inclu-
ding the corpse ¢ in mortuary practice, entails
a transformation to a continued existence in a
spiritual sense.
The idea is central to his thesis that there exists
‘‘a natural connection between the beliefs
concerning the disintegration of the body, the
fate of the souls, and the state of the survivors
during that same period’’ (Hertz, 1960: 53).
Hertz formulated the theory with regard to the
particular case of secondary funerals ¢ with a
strong emphasis on the ones found in Indonesia,
but also dealing with examples from the Ameri-
cas, Melanesia and Australia. The accomplish-
ment of the mortuary rituals, the transition of
the soul to the other world, the period of mour-
ning for the survivors, and the decomposition of
the corpse ¢ that is, until only the dry, bare bones
remain, coincide. The decay of the corpse stands
central in Hertz’s essay, but if we shift the focus
of attention from the human material remains to
the material objects that belonged to the
deceased, it can be argued that in certain socie-
ties both the deceased and their intimate posses-
sions require (partial) destruction to achieve
passage to another realm of existence.
This would make sense when the personal
effects are viewed as inseparable of one’s mate-
rial being in the world, that is, one with the
imagery of the physical body. In other words, it
suggests that the mortuary practice under dis-
cussion hinges on a particular concept of per-
son. The disposal of the corpse is not enough in
these circumstances, because the deceased still
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has a presence and identity of the living in the
intimate possessions.
These things arouse the emotion of that per-
son somehow still being there. Lorimer Fison
and William Howitt, for example, notice with
regard to the Kurnai (of South-East Australia)
that:
‘‘the personality is very limited in extent, and in
reality can only include weapons, implements, and
garments. But the garments, and very often the wea-
pons and implements of the deceased were rolled up
with his corpse or buried, from a reluctance on the part
of his relatives to have constantly before them, after
the funeral ceremonies, anything which might recall
his loss and their grief.’’ (1991[1880]: 245)
Without the disposal of the personal belon-
gings along with the corpse the transition of the
deceased from the world of the living to the
world of the dead would be incomplete. We can
safely assume a deterioration of the body as well
as the personal apparel and artifacts.
Hertz (1960: 46) recognizes the variability in
the intensity and duration of destruction: it may
be a gradual, time-consuming process or occur
rather instantly. Baldwin Spencer and Frank
Gillen report that among the Arrente the
deceased’s ‘‘camp is at once burnt down, all the
contents being destroyed’’ (1927, vol. 2: 431).
Further examples from Aboriginal Australia
could be cited (see Berndt and Berndt 1988:
455-465), showing either a swift or a gradual
destroyal of the dead’s belongings, for instance,
by letting things rot or wear away. The point is
that there exists a close link between the
deceased and their personal possessions: and as
the person has to go, so too have these things.
This notion would have made sense to the
Tlingit in Alaska, because ‘‘clothing was used as
another layer of the body’s surface and was
believed to be closely associated with it’’ (Kan
1989: 60). Therefore, it will come as no surprise
that the personal belongings were burnt together
with the corpse (ibid.: 35-36). The fire ‘‘freed the
spiritual essence (inside) of the deceased’s mate-
rial possessions, which his spirit could now use in
the other world’’ (ibid.: 111). Sergei Kan makes
clear that for the Tlingit personal possessions,
such as clothing, were an extension of the body:
‘‘the body was covered with clothing consisting of
natural substances (skins, roots, wood) transformed
through human labor into a social skin which both
protected and concealed the natural one. Close asso-
ciation existed between the person’s self and his or her
clothing. In this respect, the latter was analogous to
various bodily effluvia and such substances as hair and
fingernails, which were periodically separated from the
body’’ (1989: 63).
We may, of course, also consider the physical
body itself an artifact.
Tiwi grieve over the loss of material objects
The forementioned Tiwi from North Austra-
lia not only grieve over the loss of a loved one
(the corpse) but also over the loss of their own
personal possessions. In both instances, they use
the same term. One thus closely identifies with
one’s effects.
Striking in this regard is the fact that personal
belongings can substitute for the corpse in Tiwi
graves. It is not uncommon for postfuneral
rituals to be held out bush around a grave
without a corpse: a grave with the personal
effects of the deceased is as good as one with the
(actual) body.
According to local belief, the destruction of
someone’s clothes equals killing that person
(hence the exchange of clothes is taken as a sign
of friendship and trust). The same accounts for
bodily excretions and such substances as hair
and fingernails, which are periodically separated
from the body. And, of course, it does so for
other material extensions of the body. When
men burned the clothes of wives or lovers (called
tupilipiami) who either had left them or were
considered unfaithful, it meant they were
‘‘finished’’ with them.
This breaking up of a relationship also takes
place in the ritual burning of clothes of the
deceased (called amprakatika). Moreover, in
both instances a relationship between affines is
terminated in this way. (In pre-contact times,
Tiwi went naked, and bereaved spouses had to be
satisfied with burning pubic hair. The singed
pubic hair symbolised the termination of the
relationship between spouses. I was told that the
‘‘new hair’’ would be for the ‘‘new wife’’ or hus-
band.) In the latter case, the in-laws, with the
exception of the actual widow or widower, have
to perform certain tasks as ritual workers (amba-
ruwi). Among other things, they have to collect
the dead person’s clothes and personal belon-
gings. These had become taboo (pukamani) after
the owner’s death and therefore had to be des-
troyed, buried, or thrown into the sea. The tasks
of the ritual workers could not be carried out by
the dead person’s relatives in other categories of
bereaved kin, who were restricted by mourning
taboos. They are the only ones allowed to handle
and dispose of the corpse. And they have to
destroy or dispose of the newly dead’s personal
effects as well.
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These objects become taboo upon death,
because they are closely associated ¢ either as
‘‘extensions’’ or as ‘‘stand-ins’’ ¢ with the lifeless
physical body ¢ an object itself. Without the
disposal of the personal belongings along with
the corpse the transition of the deceased from
the world of the living to the world of the dead
would be incomplete. The ritual workers destroy,
or get rid of, the things of the dead in various
ways. The personal effects are broken to pieces,
buried, left on the grave, burnt or thrown into the
sea. The workers clear out the house of the
deceased, ‘‘empty the cupboards’’ and all. The
personal belongings, together with a heavy
stone, are sometimes wrapped in plastic, tied
with a cord. Next, this is taken in a dinghy and
thrown overboard to the bottom of the sea.
Things of the dead are left behind on the grave to
decompose. Or they are buried with the corpse.
Nobody wants these things because it hurts
the survivors to be reminded too much of the
deceased (see for the ambiguity of such destruc-
tions and related feelings also Lemonnier, this
volume). Besides, anything associated with the
identity of a living person becomes taboo after
death: the personal names, voices on tape, ima-
ges in photos, house and yard, places frequented,
the place of death and even the land out bush
may not to be visited or hunted. This lasts for a
considerable time: the postfuneral rites must
have been accomplished and cleansing rites with
smoke must have been performed. Whether it
takes months or years, very much depends on the
emotions and needs of the survivors. Houses of
the newly dead may be abandoned forever. The
belongings of the deceased, more than anything
else, make people sad. The erasure of these
things is necessary.
So a guitar may be broken into pieces, a car
wrecked, a house destroyed, and almost new
clothes burnt or dropped on the bottom of the
sea. Symbolic killing is also an important theme
in the ritual drama, given its purpose to direct
the spirit of the dead from the world of the living
to the world of the dead. This killing or destruc-
tion is so sudden and abrupt as well as irreversi-
ble that it serves perfectly as a powerful image of
the radical breaking of ties and separation in
mortuary ritual. According to Hertz, ‘‘It is so
true that natural death is not sufficient to sever
the ties binding the deceased to this world, that
in order to become a legitimate and authentic
inhabitant of the land of the dead he must first
be killed’’ (1960: 73; see for another good exam-
ple, Taylor 1996). Also the deceased’s personal
belongings, as we have seen, are subjected to
some kind of killing or destruction by means of
burning, drowning or burial. It is part of the
process of killing the dead person, which is dee-
med necessary by Hertz.
When not directly put away after death, things
like clothes, mattresses and sheets may later
sometimes be deliberately used as a focus in
ritual when an emotionally compelling remem-
brance of the dead person is desirable. The house
formerly occupied by the deceased and items
hard to replace (such as cars, dinghies, VCRs,
football trophies) would, however, be ritually
cleansed with smoke. After cleansing had taken
place, people might move into the house again or
it might not be reoccupied for a considerable
time, if ever. It would all very much depend on
the emotions and needs of the people concerned.
Before the cleansing ritual, houses and yards
would be taboo (only accessible to the ritual
workers who gather the personal belongings of
the deceased) and often marked as such. In case
of a fatal motor vehicle accident, the spot where
the accident had occurred would become taboo
and the road would be blocked off. A special
‘‘open ‘em up’’ ceremony (ampuraprapununga)
or cleansing rite with the erection of a mortuary
pole would have to be performed before the road
could be used again by traffic. Sometimes after
the death of a senior person the road or pathway
to that person’s ‘‘country’’, an area with an
ancestral grave, would be temporarily closed.
After the death of the most senior (important)
person of a country, a relatively rare occurrence,
the country may be ritually cleansed.
Whether places other than the house occupied
by the deceased and the place of death would
have to be ritually cleansed varied depending on
the social position of the deceased, the type of
death, and, of course, people’s sentiments and
needs. The need to ritually cleanse a number of
places would be especially important after unex-
pected and sudden deaths, the most shocking of
all. It was after these unforeseen deaths, I was
frequently told, that the spirits of the newly dead
bothered the living. The places frequented by
these persons when alive would then be cleansed.
Hereafter these things will be destroyed also.
Jack Goody (1962: 307) explains the wide-
spread practice of the destroyal of the belon-
gings of the dead as follows:
‘‘From the actor’s point of view, goods are des-
troyed not only because they are dangerous to the
survivors, but also because of the related idea that the
holders of rights continue to maintain these interests
even in death’’.
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Again, such goods seem to be seen as insepa-
rable from the rightful owners. The rightful
owners here are the deceased. The practices of
widow-burning and the killing of slaves ¢ at the
death of their owner ¢ might also be seen in this
light.
Peter Metcalf and Richard Huntington (1991:
25) rightly note that ‘‘the issue of death throws
into relief the most important cultural values by
which people live their lives and evaluate their
experiences. Life becomes transparent against
the background of death, and fundamental
social and cultural issues are revealed.’’
Embodiment: production of material objects for
the deceased’s spirits
Besides intimate possessions being destroyed
there are in Tiwi mortuary ritual also things for
the dead. The ritual workers produce large, ela-
borately carved and painted polychrome poles.
These sculptured tree trunks are erected around
the grave at the conclusion of the cycle of mor-
tuary rituals. Art historian Jennifer Hoff (2000)
has described them as ‘‘gifts for the dead.’’ These
things for the dead, however, are also things
of the dead. The workers, who are the only
ones who may dispose of the corpse, cut trees in
the area that is perceived as the deceased’s
‘‘country’’ or land. This occurs after the burial
of the corpse, when the area is taboo for eve-
ryone except the workers.
In Tiwi mortuary ritual we do not have a
secondary treatment of the remains but a treat-
ment of tree trunks or poles (see also Venbrux
1995). They are cut in the area surrounding the
grave, preferably from the bloodwood tree
(wuringelaka). A red substance resembling blood
flows from the stem when this type of tree is cut.
When head-cutting was still a general practice
(at least until the mid-1950s) human blood
likewise had to flow on the grave. Next, the woo-
den stems are ‘‘skinned,’’ the bark is removed.
Then they are carved with an axe in abstract but
unique shapes (with forks or limbs; and also
openings in the poles). The white poles of hard-
wood, about as tall as a human being, are dried
over a smoking fire. When dry, they will be pain-
ted with ochres supplied by close relatives of the
deceased.
The making of the poles parallels the ritual
processing of the bodies of the bereaved. The
bodies of close relatives of the deceased also go
through a fire, made by the workers, and are
ritually cleansed with smoke. Both are laid down
to be painted with ochres. The geometrical de-
signs on the mortuary poles are the same as those
applied to the bodies of the bereaved.
Lying down has the connotation of death or
sleep in contrast to standing up. The people ¢
with their bodies painted up ¢ raise to their feet;
likewise a mortuary pole will be erected, and be
called ‘‘the one that is standing up’’ (apurununin-
ginti). Although movements are made with the
poles, they cannot display the energetic dances
of the living. Tiwi, however, believe that the
spirits of the dead simultaneously do so. Fur-
thermore, the Melville Island bloodwood is a
species demonstrating exceptional vitality: the
tree ‘‘may shoot up to 2 or 3 metres in a few
months’’ (Hearne, 1975: 61). The mortuary
poles symbolize the vitality, or life essence, of the
durable bloodwood trees. The wailing partici-
pants hold the poles, which first have been hit or
‘‘killed’’ by the workers, as if these represent a
tactile presence of the deceased.
The durable wooden poles might be seen as
relics. The poles as well as graves ¢ no matter
they contain corpses or things of the dead ¢
provide the patrilineal descendants of the
deceased with the strongest possible claims to
the land in the area concerned. Therefore, there
can be strong disagreements about where a new
grave has to be located. During my fieldwork, for
instance, a corpse was kept in prison overnight to
prevent some relatives from stealing the body to
have it buried elsewhere. The burial sites with
mortuary poles are the places where the spirits of
the dead ‘‘live’’. Often spirits are connected with
particular trees. I was told the poles were erected
at the time of the secondary rituals to keep the
spirits there. The lapse of time between the fune-
ral and post-funeral or secondary rituals was not
related to the decomposition of the corpse to the
point ‘‘when the bones are dry’’, but to ‘‘skin-
ned’’ (or defleshed) dry wood. The durable poles,
embodying the spirits of the dead, mediate
between the living and the death. For example,
they do so in the promotion of good hunting,
luck, protection, and health of the living. To the
last purpose some used to bring cans of beer, put
it on a pole. The poles or relics mark and give
permanence to the transmission of shared rights
to land across the generations. This in contrast to
the things of the dead, which are destroyed by
people of the same generation.
Personal belongings substitute for the
deceased, when there is more than one grave as
each classificatory father can organize funeral
rites ¢ with or without a corpse ¢ and personal
effects are buried instead of the corpse. Tiwi
people do away with a dead person’s objects for
both emotional and cosmological reasons.
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Fred Myers reports that the Pintupi of Cen-
tral Australia ‘‘regard themselves as having an
assured identity no matter what happens to the
personal possessions’’ (1991: 73). They are given
away to distant relatives or destroyed ¢ even a
nearly-new motor-car could be burnt. The sight
of these things causes grief. Myers (1991) points
out that these things are deemed replaceable, in
contrast to the ancestral connections to the land,
which can be seen as an objectification of social
relationships. For the Pintubi the real value thus
lies in social investments, not in material things
accumulated throughout a lifetime. People, as he
puts it, are ‘‘burning the truck and holding the
country’’. They identify with places, and these
connections are shared and irreplaceable. Des-
troyal of the deceased’s personal belongings is
performed by people of the same generation,
while the immaterial memories of connections
to the land have permanence and are transmitted
across generations.
Destroying belongings of the dead is a wides-
pread practice. Roger Lohmann (this issue)
unravels the various strategies employed by the
Asabano in Papua New Guinea. He writes from
his own experience: ‘‘It amazed me when they
would cut down fruit-bearing trees that a
deceased loved one had planted and tended for
the benefit of her family’’ (pers. comm.; see also
Hertz, 1960: 38). According to Goody (1962),
destruction of the intimate possessions of the
deceased took place in Native North America,
Aboriginal Australia and pre-Christian Europe.
Both Arnold van Gennep (1960 [1909]: 164) and
Ronald Grimes (2000: 220) regard the destroyal
of the deceased’s possessions as a rite of separa-
tion. Van Gennep (1960) nevertheless maintains
that ‘‘death is an initiation’’. We have seen that it
is as much a rite of incorporation, for the des-
truction accomplishes the transition to the world
of the dead. It accompanies the decomposition
of the corpse; when the bones are dry, according
to Hertz, the deceased has passed to the other
world. The personal effects are very closely asso-
ciated with the physical body and personality of
the deceased and, therefore, it is necessary that
when the corpse decays that the additional
‘‘flesh’’ or the dead’s belongings disappear as
well.
Conclusion
Whereas transference of property of the
deceased to survivors has been abundantly dealt
with in the anthropological literature (e.g.,
Goody, 1962), the phenomenon of the erasure of
the dead’s personal belongings is still in need of
explanation. In this article I have been concerned
with the question of why people would want to
destroy or get rid of the intimate possessions of
the deceased.
My point of departure was Robert Hertz’s
seminal essay ‘A contribution to the study of the
collective representation of death’ ¢ first
published in French in 1907, and in an English
translation in 1960. The impact that Hertz’s
ideas continue to have on anthropological theo-
rizing of mortuary ritual can hardly be underes-
timated.
Here I have extended his argument ¢ taking
the body as root metaphor ¢ to the treatment of
material objects related to the deceased. These
objects might as well be part of the concept of
the person.
The body, including its material extensions, is
of crucial importance in the relationship
between persons and things. I looked at embo-
died material dimensions of Tiwi death rituals,
asking why some objects are kept as relics or
heirlooms, while others are destroyed.
In his review of mortuary practices world-
wide, Nigel Barley (1995: 85) asserts that
‘‘two lines of thought are common where
intimate possessions are concerned’’: they are
destroyed or kept as mementos. It is my conten-
tion that in both cases they are given special
treatment. In both cases, it helps to construct a
new relationship between the living and the
dead.
Hertz argued that the soul or spirit of the
deceased has passed to the other world when the
corpse’s flesh has gone, and the bones are dry.
The personal effects are very closely associated
with the physical body and personality of the
deceased and, therefore, it is necessary that when
the corpse decays that the additional ‘‘flesh’’ or
the dead’s belongings disappear as well. They
are destroyed to constitute the new spirit of the
dead.
Where the deceased’s belongings are not des-
troyed but kept as mementos as in the case of the
poles, they might be seen in analogy to Hertz’
model as a different class of objects: not of the
‘‘flesh’’-type but of the ‘‘bone’’-type ¢ these
things become relics or heirlooms. They serve as
mediators, a means of communication, between
the living and the dead.
In both cases though ¢ the objects being kept
or destroyed ¢ they are given special treatment.
The practices are telling about the connection
between the material and the spiritual.
Changes in the treatment of the corpse and
associated material objects one therefore would
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expect to have consequences for people’s pers-
pective on death. Alternatively, it suggests that
changes in ideas about death might reflect in the
adaptation of ritual practices. In other words,
when people’s notions of the spiritual change
the material side of mortuary ritual will change
as well, and vice versa.
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